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Objective: This study aims to analyze some elements of representative democracy, 
confronting them with the political functions inherent to the species and the Judiciary. 
It discusses what would be the limits of the manager in the choice of public policies to 
be carried out and, in their absence or failure, the limits of the intervention of the 
Judiciary in this eminently political area. 
 
Methodology: The research adopts a hypothetical-deductive approach, through 
bibliographic research and concrete cases. 
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Results: In a factual scenario in which the Judiciary is increasingly intervening in the 
political-administrative sphere, influencing decision-making by elected officials, who 
are now proactively controlled by members of the Judiciary (decisions counter-
majoritarian), we observe a crisis of discretion and reversal of institutional roles. Based 
on the results of the study, it is recognized that judicial control can generate what the 
doctrine calls judicial activism, through decisions that oppose the constitutional text 
and that sometimes result in arbitrary or erroneous acts. In the end, it is concluded that 
to protect the constitutional principles, the application by the Judiciary of the principles 
of reasonableness and proportionality in the investigation of the specific case occupy 
a mandatory position. 
 
Contributions: The study addresses a divergent and complex theme, causing the 
reader to reflect on the consequences that judicial activism can cause in the 
representative system. Criteria are presented that serve to mitigate the negative 
impacts of the interventions of the Judiciary on public policies, seeking to preserve the 
representative system. 
 
Keywords: Representative democracy; Public Policies; Discretion; Judicial Control; 
Activism.  
                     
                                                  
RESUMO  
 
Objetivos: O presente estudo objetiva analisar alguns elementos da democracia 
representativa, confrontando-os com as funções políticas inerentes à espécie e o 
Poder Judiciário. Discute-se quais seriam os limites do gestor na escolha das políticas 
públicas a serem realizadas e, na sua falta ou falha, os limites da intervenção do Poder 
Judiciário nesta seara eminentemente política. 
 
Metodologia: A pesquisa adota uma abordagem hipotético-dedutiva, através de 
pesquisa bibliográfica e de casos concretos.  
 
Resultados: Em um cenário fático em que cada mais o Poder Judiciário intervêm na 
esfera político-administrativa, influenciando na tomada de decisões por agentes 
eleitos, que passam a ser controladas de modo proativo por membros do Poder 
Judiciário (decisões contra majoritárias), observa-se uma crise de discricionariedade 
e inversão de papéis institucionais. Com base nos resultados do estudo, reconhece-
se que o controle judicial pode gerar o que a doutrina denomina ativismo judicial, 
através de decisões que contrapõe o texto constitucional e que por vezes resultam em 
atos arbitrários ou errôneos. Ao final, conclui-se que para resguardo os princípios 
constitucionais, a aplicação por parte do Poder Judiciário dos princípios da 
razoabilidade e proporcionalidade na averiguação do caso concreto ocupam posição 
de obrigatoriedade. 
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Contribuições: O estudo aborda tema divergente e complexo, fazendo com que o 
leitor reflita acerca das consequências que o ativismo judicial pode causar no sistema 
representativo. São apresentados critérios que servem para minorar os impactos 
negativos das intervenções do Poder Judiciário nas políticas públicas, buscando 
preservar o sistema representativo. 
 
Palavras-chave: Democracia representativa; Políticas Públicas; Discricionariedade; 
Controle Judicial; Ativismo. 
  
 
1  INTRODUCTION 
 
Nowadays there is an interest in public policies and the clear lack (or flaw) of 
investment in areas that need some improvement, which are the ones that directly 
affect the poor population and consequently violate fundamental rights. However, it 
cannot be denied the existence of elaborated electoral procedures to select and elect 
representatives who, in a certain period, are going to lead social interests (including 
public policies) in their own way.  
Such context provides a representative democracy environment whose 
elected agents can officially make decisions and have a political role. The political role 
has management issues such as the liberty to choose areas for investment and the 
accomplishment of the government plan.  
Under such perspective, the question within the following paper is as follows: 
“How far does administrative discretion when managing public policies go?” Can the 
political agents do what they please? How can the Judiciary intervene in such cases?   
Regardless the answers for the questions asked above, nowadays the 
Judiciary is extremely active in controlling public policies by imposing certain practices 
for the agents to follow. Such attitude is present in several levels of jurisdiction and it 
discusses what would be the limits for such intervention taking into consideration the 
administrative discretion.       
There are arguments for both sides. Thus, the paper is going to show a brief 
analysis of the arguments that can stop or favor the Judiciary intervention like the 
existential minimum and the possible reserve as well as an analysis of the 
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representative democratic scenario, which gives the political agent the power to make 
such decisions.  
Besides, the judicial control under scrutiny tends to spread activist judicial 
decisions, which is going to show the need of an investigation if judicial activism is 
accepted and legitimated by the current constitutional system.  
Then, without the pretension of exhausting the issue, the following paper tries 
to deal with problems related to public policies and the Judiciary, especially when it 
comes to the possibility, or not, of the acceptance of decisions made by non-elected 
agents. Such decisions are seen as counter-majoritarian, which goes against 
democracy. On the other hand, judiciary active actions along with the democratic gaps 
legitimate such actions as a replacement of the political agents as it is going to be seen 
along the paper.  
 
  
2  THE PROCEDURAL REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY 
 
In order to stablish the political and judicial scenario related to public policies 
issues displayed in this paper, it is paramount to approach, even briefly, some aspects 
of the representative democracy. Such approach is justified due to the fact that within 
democratic systems, the elected agents are legitimate elements to make political 
decisions and that is exactly where public policies are made.     
Therefore, according to Giovani Sartori theory, politics is an electoral dispute 
for positions within the State whose role is to legislate for others (SARTORI, 1994, p. 
126). The concept presented by Sartori is extremely important to show, at least in a 
representative democracy, that the political environment is of representation. It means 
the elected ones are going to represent the voters as well as represent their interests.   
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According to Robert Dahl, representative democracy is the way to overcome 
problems that obstruct the implementation of a fully participative democracy. According 
to him, assembly (participative) democracy impedes effective democracy practice1.  
Thus, in 1820 James Stuart Mill described the representation system as “the 
greatest discovery of modern times” (DAHL, 2001, p. 120) implying that it would be 
possible to ally democracy to the modern society being set with bigger territories and 
growing populations. Mill considers representation as the solution to overcome the 
State size limits and to allow citizens’ participation through representation. Such sliding 
scale of the democratic system through representation builds a complex state 
organization network.     
The change of the scale and its consequences towards representation as well 
as the increase of diversity and conflicts helped the development of a set of political 
institutions that, as a whole, differentiate representative democracy, defined by DAHL 
as a “polyarchy”, from other older democratic, or non-democratic, political systems 
(DAHL, 2012, p. 346). The institutions mentioned by Robert Dahl show a State that 
has its representative operation based on the political system, complementing the 
division of power proposed by Montesquieu, where Legislative, Executive 
(Administrative) and Judiciary roles are grouped.  
Considering such context and such Democratic State basis, the transference 
of Estate executory and legislative responsibility withdraws political autonomy from 
citizens, which is based on legislations approved by representatives. Such legislations 
are legitimate and are executed through the law. (HABERMAS, 2003, p. 183).         
The brief description of some the pillars of representative democracy brings 
the conclusion that such responsibility transference to the “representatives” is a 
legitimate procedure. Therefore, it is the political agents’ role to make political decisions 
like investing and sending funds into health, education, and public safety and others.  
Thus, it is paramount to verify some issues related to the political role regarding 
representative democracy and check if it allows counter-majoritarian decisions made 
 
1 Robert Dahl in his book "On Democracy”, tries to build a democratic theory, which allows as much 
representation as citizens’’ effective participation. However, due to this paper proposal, it is going to 
focus on representation in its simplest meaning to make its proposal feasible. 
Revista Jurídica                        vol. 03, n°. 60, Curitiba, 2020. pp. 384 - 406 
                                                             
_________________________________________ 
 
Revista Jurídica Unicuritiba. Curitiba.V.03, n.60, p. 384-406, Jul-Set. 2020 
 [Received/Recebido: Maio 13, 2019; Accepted/Aceito: Maio 02, 2020] 
 
Este obra está licenciado com uma Licença Creative Commons Atribuição-NãoComercial 4.0 Internacional.’1 
by agents who are not chosen through the representative system, which is going to be 
seen in the next item and it is going to help to consolidate the idea of the following 
paper.      
  
 
3  THE POLITICAL ROLE OF CONSENTED REPRESENTATION 
 
As explained in item 2, it is advisable to display some practical and theoretical 
elements regarding representation to understand the current proposal.  
Sartori in his book “The Theory of Democracy Revisited” questions the idea of 
demos, the ancient Greek word for the ordinary citizens of a city-state and the act and 
role of governing. Thus, it is clear that representation comes under the form of free and 
just elections, which is a way to legitimate representatives to act on behalf of citizens: 
 
 
Governments that are elected because they reflect voters’ wishes as well 
having political responsibility for that, by having other free elections, are the 
ones that can be named, in a free interpretation, consented governments 
(SARTORI, 1994, p. 126).    
 
 
It is clear that representative government portraits people’s consent. In 
addition, they participate in electoral procedures and believe the elected agents make 
decisions related to the political institutions.     
In a contemporary point of view, it is possible to say that citizens elected for 
representative positions would be responsible to manage the public system. Thus, 
such elected citizens should apply political-administrative directives according to their 
government proposals or, at length, according to what is convenient to them.  
When it comes to the Executive, where public policies are more common, it is 
the agent’s responsibility the necessary measures to put public management in motion, 
respecting expenses budget execution foreseen in the budgetary law proposed by 
such agent. Thus, it is clear that the citizens who grant the agent the power to decide, 
which ends in its acceptance, accept the operation and practices adopted by the 
representative.  
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Such understanding agrees to Jürgen Habermas in his book “Between Facts 
and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy”, which says 
that one of the presuppositions is the acceptance of the results produced by the elected 
representatives when they make decisions aligned with what society accepts. The 
political role of representation, when done correctly, reflects the will of the people and 
consequently their sovereignty. Even when there is some kind of disagreement, the 
democratic environment has conflicts of ideas and proposals and it has dispute as part 
of its essence, which does not exclude the immanent democratic proposal that belong 
to the consented political role.  
However, the consensus is easily visualized in an abstract environment, which, 
according to Habermas, would validate the system. Thus, consensus should be 
considered as part of equal opportunities given to whom it may concern and specially 
to people’s legitimacy will that elects agents to legislate in the name of others. Such 
idea has some contradictions when there is a “third party” within politics, which is a risk 
of damaging the democratic system as well as going against will of the people of not 
wanting non-legitimate individuals.    
  
 
4  PUBLIC POLICIES AND ADMINSTRATIVE DISCRETION  
 
Discretion belongs to administrative law, which is characterized by a power of 
decision by the manager; however, it is a much broader concept.  
The doctrine is going to connect discretion to several definitions that relate to 
various themes, as it applicability in regulations and administrative acts, technical 
appraisals, Public Administration principles, and finally public policies. The authors 
decided to present the concept of discretion in a superficial way to follow the initial idea 
of the following paper, which intends to discuss administrative discretion towards public 
policies.   
According to Luiz Manuel Fonseca Pires, even if the initial ideal one might 
have that discretion is about having the power of choosing, it is always juridically 
entailed, under strict rules and it is not, in fact, a free power (FONSECA PIRES, 2008, 
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p. 149). He also says that discretion is always entailed and consequently not free from 
legal determinations: “It deals with stablishing attributions, which can make Public 
Administration to choose one among equally legitimate options or they can previously 
define one possible option only” (FONSECA PIRES, 2008, p. 149).  
Thus, one can understand that discretion is not a manager unlimited power of 
making decisions in an undetermined way, but like entailed acts have regulations, 
discretion acts are equally entailed in its area of permissibility.   
According to Fernando Saiz Moreno, discretion is limited to the application of 
non-juridical criteria, while the decision criteria surpasses the juridical area and 
becomes political (SAIZ MORENO, 1976, p. 312). In the end, as a final concept, it is 
considered that discretion decision takes place when they happen within one or two 
solutions, where they are all equally valid for the law (SAIZ MORENO, 1976, p. 304-
305). Under such discretion perspective, respecting the legal principles and the 
peculiarities of the discretion act that is going to be limited to a certain number of 
options (equal for the law) as well as a choice through a political decision, it is 
paramount to discuss public policies and the discretion influence.  
Public policies are, according to Maria Dallari Bucci, “government initiatives to 
manage the means available for the State and its private activities to perform the 
relevant socially and politically determined objectives” (BUCCI, 2006, p. 241). Fabio 
Konder Comparato claims that public policies are an activity that are set through a 
group of organized regulations and legal obligations that are united by a purpose, 
which means an objective previously determined (COMPARATO, 1997, p. 353).  
Therefore, public policies hold the idea that a manager, respecting the 
pertinent legislation and the attributions of each level of government, should direct the 
resources to specific areas such as health, education, public safety, and others.  
It is evident that decisions related to public policies affect Public Administration 
discretion acts and should focus on public interest as a qualifying element of the public 
agent choices regardless the constitutional and infra-constitutional legislation. As an 
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example, it is worth mentioning article 2122 of the Brazilian Constitution that says the 
Federal Government should invest at least 18% of its budget in maintaining and 
developing education, while States and Cities should invest 25%.  
It is clear that there is a constitutional regulation that dictates the minimum 
resource use in each public policy. If the amount is not enough, the manager has the 
autonomy to increase it, which is a discretion act. In a representative democracy, the 
political agent (who, despite participative procedures, is deeply inserted in the Brazilian 
State) directs investments as he/she pleases.  
The political agent, since being elected, has to exert his/her munus the best 
way he/she pleases or respect political party policies of his/her administration. Thus, 
the agent leads the public policies to areas of his/her convenience. Since the 
Constitution stablishes minimum amounts of resource investments only in education 
and health, other investments are in charge of the agent.   
There is no way to deny that public policies are management political acts, 
since there are no legal impediments, therefore prioritizing certain areas would not be 
illegal. Thus, for instance, if an agent is in favor of an administration, whose proposal 
is focused more on education; such agent tends to direct more resources to that area 
than of what is foreseen in the constitution. 
However, when the judiciary intervenes and determines that the Government 
adopts practices related to public policies, potential problems may emerge and maybe 









2 CF, Art. 212. The Federal Government will invest, annually, at least eighteen per cent, and States and 
Cities twenty-five per cent from taxes in maintaining and developing education. 
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5  THE JUDICIARY VERSUS PUBLIC POLICIES: IS THERE A WAY TO 
RECONCIALE THEM? 
 
As seen on item 4, public policies are competences of the Executive and the 
Legislative with their specificities. However, there have been more and more cases of 
direct Judiciary intervention in order to try to compel government representatives to a 
certain behavior. There have been recent examples of such intervention like when 
there is a legal decision to enroll a minor in a day care, when there is the obligation to 
supply medication to someone or a surgery on the State expenses and so on.  
 The interesting fact is that in many interventions the attempt to solve the 
problem might affect higher levels in the administration than only the Judiciary. That 
was what happened in 2013 in the state of Sao Paulo, where more than 7,400 
preliminary order court decisions forced the referred state to enroll children in day 
cares. As the state had already a waiting line of more than 111,000 children, it enrolled 
the children contemplated in the court decisions before the ones in the waiting line, 
which caused an isonomy problem as well as harming the ones who did not sue the 
state government on such matter3.    
The example mentioned above brings the following question: Has the judicial 
control (sometimes extreme) solved the problem?   
The possible answer tends to be negative. It is known that judicial control is 
part of the Power Balance, which can be included in the checks and balances system. 
Considering the necessity of controlling both government departments in order to avoid 
duty deviation and abuse of power, the checks and balances system proposes a 
relative autonomy for each Power, creating control mechanisms and act correction.     
 
 
Due the proliferation of fundamental rights within Constitutions as well as the 
assumption they are principles that can clash in specific cases, there is a 
social necessity to maximize the application of each one of the fundamental 
rights in order to develop a new conception of separation of powers. There is 
an understanding that law and politics are no longer totally separated areas 
 
3 O Estado de S. Paulo newspaper, June 3 2013: "From January to April, São Paulo City Hall got 7.408 
court orders forcing the enrollment of children in day cars. To do that it would need 37 new day cares. 
The waiting line for day cares is of about 111 thousand children. (P. 1 and Metrópole A14)". 
Revista Jurídica                        vol. 03, n°. 60, Curitiba, 2020. pp. 384 - 406 
                                                             
_________________________________________ 
 
Revista Jurídica Unicuritiba. Curitiba.V.03, n.60, p. 384-406, Jul-Set. 2020 
 [Received/Recebido: Maio 13, 2019; Accepted/Aceito: Maio 02, 2020] 
 
Este obra está licenciado com uma Licença Creative Commons Atribuição-NãoComercial 4.0 Internacional.’1 
and such connection must be repressed for the State to function accordingly. 
(DE PAULA, 2011, p. 273).     
 
 
Nevertheless, the question that arises is at what extent the Judiciary is counter-
majoritarian and intervene in management issues, especially in a State that needs 
resources like in Brazil.   
It is clear how the judiciary control goes against several principles and 
institutions such as the popular sovereignty (represented by the separation of powers), 
the reserve of possible and minimum existential. Pietro Costa understands the difficult 
mutual compatibility between popular sovereignty and the application of State 
fundamental rights by other Powers but the State itself since people sovereignty and 
fundamental rights of the subjects are both principle that cannot be given up and then 
their coexistence generates a tension hard to overcome (COSTA, 2011, p. 232). 
It is fair to say there is a problem between fundamental principles, which must 
be solved and in order to define of one of them as a default. Two reasons, the reserve 
of possible and minimum existential theories, can make such solution difficult.      
According to Luiz Manuel Fonseca Pires, the reserve of possible is divided into 
factual and juridical aspects. Factual aspects are related to the material limits to State 
resources (workforce and financial), which would impede the Judiciary of interfering in 
public policies as it pleases. The juridical aspects are related to budgetary laws (art. 
165 of CF/88) that stablish the use of resources, therefore judicial intervention would 
go against such legislation and consequently would be illegal (FONSECA PIRES, 
2008, p.288).      
Regarding the minimum existential, Ricardo Lobo Torres claims:    
 
 
The minimum existential does not have its own constitutional characteristic, 
so it is connected to the idea of freedom, within the principles of equality, 
having its own legal procedure, within free enterprise, within human rights and 
citizen immunities and privileges. It lacks specific content and embodies any 
right, even fundamental ones, like the right to health, food, etc., which are 
essential and inalienable rights (TORRES, 2009, p. 144).     
 
   
Such theory is subdivided into several bias and some of them are part of the 
reserve of possible theory when it comes to idea that the State must guarantee, 
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through juridical regulations, the rights to the individual minimum existential, but the 
application of such rights are no longer directly guaranteed. It is fair to say that such 
theory assumes that the Judiciary can only interfere in order to provide the minimum 
existential to life and human dignity.    
Such theories go against the Judiciary proactive actions when it influences 
public policies. The question is, “Wouldn’t the intervention be a way to guarantee the 
balance of powers and assure, even juridically, access to fundamental rights to the 
ones affected by it?”.  
Empirically, it is clear the existence of State initiatives to provide fundamental 
rights foreseen in the Constitution, which are provided through public policies. 
However, misplaced actions, corruption and improbity often obscure (and sometimes 
suppress) actions that, in theory, should provide such minimal essential or 
existential.                
Under such perspective, both theories may impede a possible public policies 
intervention, but since they are discretionary in their broad sense, they lose their 
potential for impeding it. It may look like a circumstance that denies a solution, but it is 
worth mentioning the “optimism of will” by Norberto Bobbio.  
It is important to highlight at least one jurist’s opinion proposal able to balance 
the Judiciary interventions and the discretion of public policies in order to have a 
feasible coherent way out in the Judiciary, Legislative and Executive both prerogatives. 
Thus, concrete case consideration criteria can be the public policies judicial 
intervention guiding agent. At first, such consideration should not be done just by the 
judge who is judging the lawsuit and intends to influence public policies. Such 
investigation should go further. Firstly, the legitimate agent such as the Brazilian 
Government Agency for Law Enforcement and Prosecution of Crimes should, before 
filling the action, analyze questions and facts that justify their attitude.        
An elaborate screening before filling the action can help in choosing concrete 
cases that in fact need to be analyzed by the Judiciary, which at this point should use 
constitutional hermeneutics and justify its decision since it is not in its area of primary 
institutional expertize.   
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Luiz Manuel Fonseca Pires mentions the consideration in issues that involve 
public policies:  
 
 
The procedure of the theory of principles consideration becomes, once more, 
a paramount tool to check this public policy administrative discretion legitimate 
environment. It is the best reserves of possible with fundamental rights 
minimum essential comparison tool in order to give to such fundamental rights 
maximum effectiveness. The principle optimizes the right to make 
fundamental rights to take place the best way possible (FONSECA PIRES, 
2008, p. 304).       
 
      
Thus, a possible way to reconcile the Judiciary, its interventions, and Public 
Policies from the other Powers is through consideration. Consideration allows the ones 
responsible for applying the law to verify if the previous budgetary dotation of investing 
in health, when it comes to the universal access to it, is being properly followed 
(art.196, CF/88) (FONSECA PIRES, 2008, p. 304).  
In addition, such consideration should focus on the reasonability and 
proportionality criteria. Reasonability, as a hermeneutic vector when it comes to 
applying proportionality regulation as foreseen in the Constitution as mentioned by 
Robert Alexy, seeks a fair balance among the desired means and ends (GRINOVER, 
2009, p. 43). Such criteria are going to allow consideration to be better applied under 
specific situations, making it proportional and reasonable, under the eyes of the State 
as well as the Judiciary.   
Finally, it is worth mentioning the democratic representation and Judiciary 
interventions within majority decisions. If politicians are allowed to do their job, practice 
politics, and the judiciary interventions are counter-majoritarian, is there the possibility 
for reconcile them?  
Reconciling “public policies and judicial control” can be considered one of the 
techniques of balancing Powers, which is part of check and balances system accepted 
by the doctrine.  
It is a fact that political agents often deviate from their primary democratic 
representation attributions, which makes the general population something incidental. 
Thus, public policies judicial control should be considered as legitimate, even having a 
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counter-majoritarian characteristic because it guarantees fundamental rights for under 
privileged people.  
Therefore, judicial control is inherent to the checks and balances system and 
it generates a phenomenon called judicial activism, which is going to be discussed 
further in this paper as judicial administrative acts or Judiciary act that can, in the end, 
overlap institutional prerogatives of other Powers.  
  
 
6  JUDICIAL ACTIVISM WITHIN THE BRAZILIAN CONSTITUTIONAL STATE  
 
As mentioned before, the Constitutional State by itself has rules that foresee 
inter power interference, especially when it comes to the checks and balances system 
and the public policies judicial control.  
However, regarding the Brazilian State, the Fundamental Law has stablished 
elements that make political decisions possible, which are going to influence the 
decisions made by the elected political representatives.   
Some examples can mentioned as the abstract control performed by the 
Supreme Court regarding Actions for Declaration of Unconstitutionality, Action for 
Declaration for Constitutionality, Claim of Non-compliance with Constitutional Precept, 
among others.  
The Constitution foresees hypothesis and ways for the Judiciary intervention 
in other Powers. Would these procedures be the basis for judicial activism?       
The doctrine would say it would not. Judicial activism is characterized when 
there is a full interpretation of the Constitution, which go over the current regulations. 
It would not be restrict related to a judicial decision, which would be similar to the 
legislation as for example if a sentence is compatible to the constitution.  
According to Strapazzon and Goldschmidt: 
 
 
In Brazil, the concept of judicial activism described by Dworkin is the one 
mostly used in the Legislative, academic means as well as by the press. 
Judicial activism has a breaking the law connotation. Yet, judicial decisions 
that refuse the literal interpretation of the constitution, as well as the supposed 
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legislator will, and do not follow canonic interpretation methods or contradict 
the Legislative constitutional interpretations (Strapazzon; Goldschmidt, 
2013).    
 
 
Thus, judicial activism cannot be confused with the Constitutional Courts 
primary attributions related to constitutionality control, which will use its control 
attributions as a checks and balances element. In addition, it works harmonically 
among the other powers, which is not considered judicial activism strictly speaking. 
According to Luiz Roberto Barroso, judicial activism goes beyond mere 
constitutional hermeneutic:  
 
 
The idea of judicial activism is associated to a broader and more intense 
participation of the Judiciary in performing constitutional means and values 
having more interference within the other two Powers. The activist posture is 
seen though different conducts that include: (i) direct Constitution application 
to situations not contemplated in its text and independently of the ordinary 
legislator action (ii) declaration of unconstitutionality of the legislator normative 
acts based on less rigid criteria regarding clear and ostensive Constitution 
violation. (iii) the imposition of conducts or abstention of the Brazilian 
Government Agency for Law Enforcement and Prosecution of Crimes when it 
comes to public policies (BARROSO, 2008, p. 04). 
 
      
Considering what was mentioned above it is easy to confuse constitutionality 
control or other Judiciary prerogatives with judicial activism. However, it is worth 
mentioning that the activism is the result of a full interpretation of the legal text or, on 
the contrary, from the disregard of   normative imperative data that would be a 
restrictive interpretation of the norm.  
Those are the political judicialization (judicial activism) situations as well as a 
potential collision to the Constitutional and Democratic State since the Judiciary could 
be invading the jurisdiction of another Power that has representatives elected by the 
people. That is why one should be careful to analyze judicial decisions fact and juridical 
circumstances that in the end have political issues.  
According to Strapazzon and Goldschmidt, 2013 (apud DWORKIN, 2007, p. 
451-452) when it comes to judicial activism Ronald Dworkin differentiates judicial 
activism from a possible arbitrariness occasionally found in decisions, which are very 
close concepts.           
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Activism is a way of juridical pragmatism. An activist judge would ignore the 
Constitutional text, the history of its enactment, the Supreme Court previous 
decisions that tried to interpret it and the long lasting traditions of the Brazilian 
political culture. The activist would ignore everything to impose other Powers, 
her/her own point of view regarding what justice requires. The right as integrity 
condemns activism and any other similar constitutional jurisdiction.        
 
 
Activism by itself, does not violate the Constitutional State. However, the 
arbitrariness that will be able to be checked in activist decisions is something that can 
be harmful to the Democratic Constitutional State.  
There are several ways of Judiciary intervention that are parallel to the 
Constitutional State and can be considered as part of a constitutional system. 
However, the critic is about when the judicial practice has an arbitrary political bias and 
go over other Powers institutional prerogatives as well as when it imposes, in a 
coercive way, the Judiciary position regarding issues that do not belong to its 
jurisdiction without a plausible justification.  
Decisions that are made through attribution deviation, abuse of power or 
violation to society interests can be considered arbitrary and then be considered a 
judicial activism deceitful tactic.  
The Constitutional State embeds several forms of judicial hermeneutic, but all 
of them must follow the Constitution. Consequently, the Judiciary and its overdone 
decisions are supposed to follow the judge free convincing principles, nevertheless 
such judge cannot make a decision that violates constitutional precepts and should 
always study the case carefully having in mind the reasonability and proportionality 
principles and considering all juridical and factual situations related to the problem.  
According to Ferraz (1994, p. 14-15), the activist judge tends to leave pure 
legal positivism boundaries, in a more dogmatic point of view, to make a decision more 
based on political reasons.  
Would the free convincing principle have a limit to impede judges from 
disrespecting the Constitution and consequently the infra-institutional legislation? Such 
limitation would be within the current Constitutional State principles.  
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It is clear that the line that separates judicial decisions from arbitrary decisions 
is tenuous. In addition, arbitrary decisions violates the Constitutional State and 
democracy itself.  
The task to identify if a judicial decision has overpassed its limits is not easy. 
Law and hermeneutic can cause a dubious interpretation as well as confuse the 
determination if a decision would be arbitrary or not.     
 For these reasons, some parts of the doctrine tend to accept activism as 
coherent only in cases that the protection of the fundamental rights is necessary, which 
is the case of public policies judicial interference.  
Thus, as it is going to be seen in item 7, when judicial activism is considered 
legal, it can be considered as a way to fill in the gaps democracy has as well as the 
gaps caused by elected representatives’ flawed decisions.  
  
 
7  JUDICIAL ACTIVISM AND DEMOCRATIC VOID: IS IT THE OVERCOMING OF 
DEMOCRACY GAPS?  
 
The following chapter resumes “democracy” as its theme, which was used as 
the basis for the first topic of the paper. The intention is to end the initial cycle, which 
was stablished to find solutions for target problem.  
One might ask what would the bedrocks that characterize judicial activism. 
Would they be a democratic deficit?  
The study tend to confirm the existence of a democratic void. When the 
Judiciary activist performance cases are checked, it is clear that there are several 
situations that it intervenes in administrative issues, management issues and even 
political issues. Many of such issues belong to the jurisdiction of other Powers.  
It was previously mentioned that when it comes to public policies control, there 
are cases which the Administration is forced to make some decisions, however such 
situations are not characterized as judicial activism. Nevertheless, in case of an 
unrestricted, invasive or disproportional performance, the control can be considered 
activist because such performance would be disproportional to the balance of Powers.  
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Under such perspective, there is a common peculiarity to all examples, which 
is the obligation of the State in providing fundamental rights listed in article 5 of the 
1988 Brazilian Constitution.  
The Judiciary cannot ignore the social needs regarding the application and 
efficiency of fundamental rights. Thus, there is a possible democratic deficit and, in 
theory, the State has the institutional obligation to guarantee society interests apart 
from the Judiciary, except in cases explained previously regarding minimum existential 
and possible reserve.  
The elected representative would be the ones who would allow such Judiciary 
political performance, which demonstrates that flaws within representation force judges 
to fill in gaps that are obstacles of providing full fundamental rights and the longed 
social evolution. On the other hand, if the State, through coherent political decisions, 
lead public administration to fulfill such requirements there would not be the need for 
the Judiciary to intervene in other Powers.  
According to Joseph Schumpeter, there are flaws in the democratic 
mechanism that cause problems in fulfilling society needs. “Democracy, in its 
plenitude, has been showing difficulties in working well due to the social class division, 
which produces successful politicians, but without the necessary democratic sense” 
(SCHUMPETER, 1984, p. 165).  
The lack of pure “essence” of democracy surely refers to representation virtues 
that should stimulate certain practices by the political representatives in order to 
represent society interests and reach State Constitution fundamental rights.  
The clear difficulty between sharing society sovereignty and reaching 
fundamental rights generates tension because to reach such rights the society 
sovereignty can be changed from its basic concept.  
The tension mentioned by Pietro Costa highlights that representation flaws in 
making political decisions can cause Judiciary intervention. If such demands were 
“spontaneously” fulfilled by the agents there would not be the need of judicializing 
politics.  
Such judicial activism must follow the consideration, proportionality and 
reasonability principles, which have been mentioned before.  
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There are some cases with judicial arbitrariness, which cannot be confused 
with judicial activism.  
According to Strapazzon and Goldschmidt, these two situations are not similar: 
 
 
In fact, wrong judicial decisions (CRFB Art. 5 LXXV) should not be called 
activist. The mistake can be called illicit or unconstitutional, but not activist. 
The judicial decision that violates the Court equality right or that violates a 
binding judicial precedent in a similar topic, should be considered simply as 
invalid or wrong. Activist, in these contexts, does not help to understand the 
concept of right or activism (Strapazzon; Goldschmidt, 2013).        
 
 
Performing policies that allow fundamental rights sovereignty is something 
expected from elected agents under a democratic perspective. However, the 
necessary actions are not often taken so that when there are neglects, the judicial 
activity (activist or not) is an action that tries to compensate the neglects.  
Judicial activism is justified when the objective is to compensate democratic 
gaps and policies that impede the implementation of fundamental rights public policies. 
It is not going to confuse each Power institutional attributions or violate the Republic 
tripartite system since such practice assumes that fundamental rights are for all society 
and not only for part of it.       
According to Mezzaroba (2013, p. 340), the differentiation of elected agents 
and judges institutional attributions, when judges are forced to interfere in certain public 




Brazilian constitutional judges are an evolution and a consequence of a 
democratic responsibility time (NOMET; SELZNICK; PHILIP, 1978; DAHL, 
1997). However, constitutional judges’ work should not be confused with 
elected politicians’ work as the judicial activism critics suggest (RAMOS, 
2010). The main theorist of rights and guarantees has not realized that 
Constitutional judges are different from ordinary judges (FERRAJOLI, 2007, 
p. 77, v. II, unofficial translation). They are different from elected politicians 
because they should always decide in favor of protecting constitutional assets 
(fundamental rights). Besides, they cannot solve the problems as the 
politicians do, which is through a mediation of interests (FISS, 1979, p. 13-
14). They do not relate to the legislated right (as ordinary judges do) nor define 
the agenda of their decisions (as elected politicians do), which are stablished 
by judicial petitioners. They do not have the power of defining social priorities 
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and then interfere in them (as elected politicians do) because the judicial 
processes are decided only if society requires justice to them.     
 
 
Thus, the Judiciary members’ decisions should protect the fundamental rights, 
especially when there is clear omission in implementing public policies that are related 
to them.  
Any attempt by the Judiciary of going beyond such limits is considered illegal 
as well as invasive and arbitrary.  
Contemporary Judicial activism can be considered as a tool from the 
Constitutional State, which above all assumes the Democratic State fundamental 
rights.  
In order to get and reach such fundamental Constitution elements, there might 
be the political Judiciary interference. Such interference used to limit itself to pertinent 
and neutral issues and it considered other Powers management omissions and flaws 
as democratic gaps to be filled in for the good of society.  
If the Executive and Legislative did their job well, the Judiciary would not have 
to interfere in politics, which has clear democratic flaws when it comes to fundamental 
rights. They should base their actions in proportionality and reasonability.  
 
  
7  CONSIDERAÇÕES FINAIS 
 
Public policies, discretion and judicial control are issues that bring discussions, 
questions and problems. Maybe more problems than solutions. But, it is necessary to 
verify the State as a whole in order to find a one of a kind solution.   
Public policies have discretion characteristics to the eyes of the political agent 
and they are not exempt of judicial control. However, such control cannot be limitless 
as public policies and discretion are not unrestrained.   
There are limits and impositions for everything in the State and that is why 
there are concrete case applicable principles consideration criteria as a judicial control 
guide, which must, by checking specific problems issues, make its decision in order to 
Revista Jurídica                        vol. 03, n°. 60, Curitiba, 2020. pp. 384 - 406 
                                                             
_________________________________________ 
 
Revista Jurídica Unicuritiba. Curitiba.V.03, n.60, p. 384-406, Jul-Set. 2020 
 [Received/Recebido: Maio 13, 2019; Accepted/Aceito: Maio 02, 2020] 
 
Este obra está licenciado com uma Licença Creative Commons Atribuição-NãoComercial 4.0 Internacional.’1 
balance the Powers relationship as well as respect fundamental rights and consider 
the minimum existential and possible reserve. Such consideration should take into 
account reasonability and proportionality, having fundamental rights as its break-even 
point.  
Democracy, in its representative role, grant political agents the freedom to, at 
their will, invest resources in several areas. However, such discretion is not exempt, 
as explained, from attribution deviation and/or omissions control.      
The State should work harmonically among its Powers and such harmony can 
be provided by the judicial control, which is one of the elements of the checks and 
balances system. Then, a counter- majoritarian decision cannot be considered invalid 
because decisions made by elected representatives, in a consented representation 
system, would be absolute and intangible.  
Currently politics, in Brazil, is undervalued due to the recent, almost daily, 
scandals on the news. Therefore, attribution deviation, in many cases, is expected 
because politicians do not hold representation anymore and their political propositions 
to get elected is just an excuse to take power over and have their own agenda to 
represent several other interests, but the population’s interests.  
It is obvious that there are exceptions, rare ones, and it is necessary to 
emphasize that discussing the problem minimizes it and stimulates the State to provide 
fundamental rights to each and every citizen no matter the social class.  
Potential Judiciary interference within the Executive is characterized as judicial 
activism and the doctrine classifies it as a necessary mechanism for the balance of 
powers. However, activist practices often interfere in politics, which make their 
relationship conflictive.    
In addition, arbitrary or mistaken decisions cannot be considered activist 
decisions because it would banalize them. It is worth mentioning that activism is 
coherent when it seeks the reinforcement of State fundamental rights implementation, 
especially when they are not being properly fulfilled and that is the cause of democratic 
void. Thus, the Judiciary, using the checks and balances system, should be proactive 
and balance public attribution performance. 
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Finally, the following paper describes the peculiarities of a democratic system, 
an analysis of elected agents’ representation and their obligation of executing public 
policies that might have a Judiciary intervention.  
 Such intervention can generate some problems and violations to powers 
separation and sovereignty, but basically it is necessary for the stablishment of public 
interest since it follows proportionality, reasonability and eminent consideration under 
the concrete case perspective.  
It is common for judicial intervention to have an activist characteristic, which 
can cause problems, but if it is applied through the principles previously mentioned it 
would be necessary action to reconcile the fundamental rights guaranteed in the 
Brazilian Constitution.  
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